by Abhijit Bhattacharyya
One does not have to be an Admiral Gorshkov (the longest serving Soviet naval chief) or Alfred Thayer Mahan (the guru of the maritime doctrine) or a Sir Julian Corbett, the Royal Navy Admiral, to state the obvious. That a navy is not built in a day and no nation can aspire to be a naval power by being at the eternal mercy of foreign suppliers and manufacturers, which can arm twist the ship users’ lack of knowledge and technology at will by taking advantage of its expertise and experience in ship building thereby resulting in the importer’s weakness and helplessness. In fact, naval history of the world is replete with instances of nations which prospered and developed during last 500 years inevitably had the advantage to traverse the entire two-thirds of the global lake in ships built in their own shipyards.
Traditionally, there have never been very many fighting ship-builders either in the 20th or the 21st century. Thus, during World War II Japan was virtually the sole Asian naval power by virtue of its ship building capacity and capability, restrictions imposed by the Washington naval disarmament conference of 1922 notwithstanding. In the west of Suez, Anglo-American supremacy was over, and superiority to the perceived “land-powers” like Germany and its European allies could never match the marine powers’ strength, stamina, endurance and industrial productivity. Hence the war ended in victory for the superior, combined naval strength of the West and defeat for the sole maritime Japanese foe.
Post-World War II, however, the rise of the Soviet Navy was the sole non-Western, non-capitalist state to pose a threat to the virtual monopoly of the Anglo-Saxon naval axis. And it happened, thanks to the Soviet Deputy Minister of Defence-cum-Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Georgiyevich Gorshkov, who initiated an unprecedented construction plan and timely execution of all ships required by the state. The Soviets challenged the West in the sea because the Soviets made the ships in their own shipyard. Hence they did not have to bank on the charity and worry about the whims of foreigners resulting in time and cost overrun.
In the post-Soviet era, it is the turn of China to pick up the thread which already has built a formidable navy with an apparent single-point agenda of an indigenous ship construction programme. True, the Chinese Navy still has a few ex-Soviet/Russian inventories in its fleet, but the variety and range of Beijing’s vessels today is simply awesome. And there lies the strength of its fleet. Thus China today, according to Jane’s Fighting Ships, 2009-2010, has a total of 54 submarines (of various class), 27 destroyers, 49 frigates and 275 fast attack and patrol craft. Of these, only 16 ships are of non-Chinese (i.e. Russian) make; 12 kilo class submarines and 4 Sovremeny destroyers.
Little wonder, the Chinese feel much more free and confident to flex their muscles and show their ships in out-of-area operations. Jane’s refers to Chinese enterprise thus, “Future historians may come to regard 2009 as the year that the Chinese Navy finally came of age.”
In the midst of the Soviet challenge to the West till the 1990s and the Chinese Navy’s “coming of age in 2009”, where does the Indian fleet stand today? How strong and self-sufficient is the navy of New Delhi? To this writer, the scenario appears to be a mixed bag of success and shortfall. The positive sides of India’s defence is the technical competency and mastery over the English language, expertise in aircraft carrier operations and combat capability in both surface and sub-surface warfare.
However, the not-so-positive factor lies in Indian inability (should one say traditional inertia!) to be self-sufficient in ship building expertise for long. The deficiency on this front is so conspicuous that one still finds all 16 submarines of the Indian Navy to be of foreign make (10 Russian ‘Kilo’,‘2Foxtrot’ and 4 German HDW class). Its sole aircraft carrier Viraat (ex-Hermes) is of British origin, 5 Rajput (Kashin class) destroyers are made in Nikolayev North shipyard (Russia), the 3 Talwar class frigates also are of Moscow origin (with three more likely to follow suit). At least five out of 12 Veer (Tarantul class) corvettes are of Russian make and so are the 4 Abhay class anti-submarine warfare patrol boats.
On the positive side, however, the Indians have made tremendous improvement in ship design, construction time reduction and planned delivery thereof. The pride of Indian ship building has been reflected in the Delhi and Kolkata class destroyers, Shivalik, Brahmaputra and Nilgiri class frigates; Kora, Khukri, Veer, Abhay and project 28 corvettes and the top of the line project of indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant which has been going on at Kochi shipyard.
Despite the mixed bag of success and shortcoming, a horrible mess appears to have been created by the failure of the Russians to stick to the delivery time schedule of the proposed refurbished and refitted Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier to India. This inordinate delay only results in an avoidable spiralling cost, which in turn affects a balanced fleet development. Indeed, one suspects that perhaps the Russians are no longer capable of producing the same quality vessels for which they made a name for themselves during the Soviet era. The period after the demise of the Soviet Union could have resulted in an acute shortage of naval technical experts thereby creating an all-round vacuum in ship-building capability of Russian shipyards.
Else, how does one justify the report that “the French government has given the go-ahead to the possible sale of a helicopter-and-troop carrying ship to Russia”? Is Russia now incapable of building even its own 15000-18000 tonne helicopter-and-troop-carrying carrier? If so, then how would the Russians be able to re-manufacture a sophisticated 45000 tonne aircraft carrier for India? Indeed, the scenario appears rather intriguing. Gorshkov has been badly delayed already. Diplomatic talks have been upgraded from the Joint Secretary to the head of government level. In between, the Captains, Admirals and Defence Ministers are failing to achieve any breakthrough. And yet the “price rise” haggling is going on.
Amidst all this, the Russians are reportedly negotiating with French civil shipbuilders STX and combat ship company DCNS for potential purchase of a Mistral class warship. Although referred to as the amphibious assault ship by Jane’s Fighting Ships 2009-2010, this 21600 tonne vessel has a range of 11000 nautical miles at 15 knots an hour and is capable of up to 16 attack helicopters in its deck thereby giving it enough teeth for offensive operations. If indeed Russia manages to clinch the deal for this ship (two of which are in the French fleet), then its navy would be able to play a role of “forward pressure, force projection, logistic support for the deployed force (ashore or at sea) . . . and command ship for combined operations.”
All indications suggest that the Russian Navy is keen on an early acquisition for a force multiplier mission in the ocean. As an Indian, one certainly cannot possibly have any grudge if a long-standing friend like Moscow acquires a floating airstrip from Europe. But why does Moscow not look into the need of its friendly South Asian navy with the same sense of urgency and sensitivity? Is the “price rise” really that grave as to delay the delivery of India’s maritime defence? One wonders!
The writer is an alumnus of the National Defence College of India and a Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
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